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Constitutional Uncertainty and the Design of
Social Insurance: Reflections on the
Obamacare Case
Michael J. Graetz* & Jerry L. Mashaw**1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2010, Barack Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (the ACA), a complex statute of more than nine hundred pages that
fulfilled his goal of extending health-insurance coverage to virtually all
Americans—an objective that previous U.S. presidents had sought and failed
to achieve for a century.2  This legislation was hotly contested in the Con-
gress, passing with the support of very few Republicans in the Senate and
none in the House.
To broaden access to health insurance, the ACA relies primarily on two
devices: (1) an expansion to Medicaid—a joint federal-state health-
insurance program for the poor and certain other persons with disabilities or
specified illnesses—to cover adults with incomes up to 133% of the poverty
level, and (2) refundable tax credits for families earning up to 400% of the
poverty level to subsidize purchases of private health insurance.3  The Medi-
caid expansion includes a federal requirement that states expand their cover-
age to meet the new, higher income threshold or face the potential
withdrawal of all federal Medicaid funds.4  Private insurers are required to
take all applicants, regardless of their health, and are prohibited from in-
creasing premiums based on preexisting medical conditions.5  The ACA also
* Wilbur H. Friedman and Columbia Alumni Professor of Tax Law at Columbia Law
School and Justus S. Hotchkiss Professor Emeritus at Yale Law School.
** Sterling Professor of Law at Yale Law School.
1 This essay is a revised and expanded version of our article (with a similar title) in THE
HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS (Nathaniel Per-
sily, Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison eds., 2013) [hereinafter THE HEALTH CARE
CASE].  It is largely based on our book MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE
SECURITY: RETHINKING AMERICAN SOCIAL INSURANCE (1999) [hereinafter GRAETZ &
MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY]. See also Jerry L. Mashaw, Legal, Imagined and Real Worlds:
Reflections on National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 38 J. HEALTH POL.
POL’Y & L. 255 (2013).
2 See generally STUART ALTMAN & DAVID SCHACTMAN, POWER, POLITICS AND UNIVER-
SAL HEALTH CARE (2011); GRAETZ & MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY, supra note 1, at 128–31 (for R
a very short history); Karen S. Palmer, Address at the Physicians for a National Health Pro-
gram (Spring 1999), available at http://www.pnhp.org/facts/a-brief-history-universal-health-
care-efforts-in-the-US (describing failures since Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency).
3 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-48, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
4 See id.
5 See id.
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2146814 
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLP\7-2\HLP204.txt unknown Seq: 2  9-AUG-13 9:28
344 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 7
contains an “individual mandate,” which requires adults not covered by
government-sponsored or employer-provided health insurance to purchase
health-insurance coverage or pay a penalty.6
Seven minutes after the President had put down his pen signing the
ACA into law, thirteen states filed lawsuits challenging the constitutionality
of both the individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion.7  Another thir-
teen states and several individuals and organizations, including the National
Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB), soon joined as plaintiffs.8  Af-
ter decisions had been rendered by several courts of appeals, the case came
to the Supreme Court in an appeal from the decision of the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals.9  The Eleventh Circuit had struck down the individual
mandate as exceeding Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause and
failing to qualify as a tax authorized by Congress’s power to tax and spend
for the general welfare.10  That court upheld the Medicaid expansion, re-
jecting a claim that it was an unconstitutional attempt to coerce states into
implementing and helping finance a federal program.11  The court found that
the individual mandate was severable from the rest of the statute, which it
upheld.12  The Fourth, Sixth, and District of Columbia Circuits had reached
different conclusions.13
The Supreme Court’s decision in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius (NFIB)14—which it announced on June 28, 2012, the
last day of its term—was one of the most eagerly anticipated in the Court’s
history.  The Court had heard an extraordinary six hours of argument during
a three-day period in March 2012, and it had received a record 136 amici
6 See id.
7 Robert N. Weiner, Much Ado: The Potential Impact of the Supreme Court Decision Up-
holding the Affordable Care Act, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE, supra note 1 (manuscript at 69, R
70); Comment, National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius: The Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act, 126 HARV. L. REV. 72, 73 (2012).
8 Comment, supra note 7, at 73. R
9 See id. at 73–75.
10 See id. at 75.
11 See id. at 74–75.
12 See Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1328 (11th Cir.
2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom; Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132
S. Ct. 2566 (2012).  Other lower courts had also held parts of the ACA to be unconstitutional.
See Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 764 F. Supp. 2d 684 (M.D. Pa.
2011); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598 (E.D. Va. 2010), rev’d, 656
F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 59 (2012).  Other courts dismissed cases on
jurisdictional grounds. E.g., Baldwin v. Sebelius, 654 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2011); N.J. Physi-
cians, Inc. v. Obama, 653 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2011); Bryant v. Holder, 809 F. Supp. 2d 563
(S.D. Miss. 2011); Calvey v. Obama, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (W.D. Okla. 2011); Peterson v.
United States, 774 F. Supp. 2d 418 (D.N.H. 2011).
13 Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 60
(2012), reh’g granted and order vacated, 133 S. Ct. 679 (2012); Thomas More Law Ctr. v.
Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 61 (2012); Seven-Sky v. Holder,
661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 63 (2012).
14 132 S. Ct. 2566.
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curiae briefs on the case.15  Unsurprisingly, the Court split on the key issues.
Four Justices—Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Breyer, and Kagan—voted to
uphold the individual mandate of the ACA as a legitimate exercise of Con-
gress’s power under the Commerce Clause and also its power to tax.16  Four
Justices—Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Kennedy—would have struck
down the individual mandate under the Commerce Clause.17  They regarded
Congress’s taxing power as inapplicable on the ground that Congress failed
to label the penalty for individuals who fail to purchase insurance a tax.18
These four Justices also regarded the Medicaid expansion requirement, with
its threat of the withdrawal of federal Medicaid funds, as unconstitutional,
and they would have struck down the entire statute.19
Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the individual mandate could not
be upheld under the Commerce Clause (or the Necessary and Proper Clause
to effectuate a statutory scheme that is regulating such commerce) on the
ground that these clauses gave Congress the power to “regulate existing
commercial activity,” not the power to compel “individuals to become ac-
tive in commerce.”20  The Chief Justice, however, voted to uphold the indi-
vidual mandate and its attendant penalty as a tax within Congress’s taxing
power.21
Chief Justice Roberts—joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, as well as
Alito, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas, making the vote on this issue 7–2—
invalidated the ACA’s provisions that provided that states that failed to ex-
pand Medicaid could lose all federal Medicaid funding.  The federal govern-
ment can, of course, place “conditions” on funding it provides to the states,
but, as the Chief Justice stated, it cannot “conscript state [agencies] into the
national bureaucratic army” through coercion.22  Leaving quite uncertain the
line between “conditions” and “coercion,” the Chief Justice wrote, “In this
case, the financial ‘inducement’ Congress has chosen is much more than
‘relatively mild encouragement’—it is a gun to the head.”23  The Chief Jus-
tice, along with Justices Breyer and Kagan, concluded, contrary to the other
four Justices voting to invalidate this provision, that this Medicaid provision
could be severed from the rest of the ACA, which “need not fall.”24
15 Greg Stohr, Record Number of Amicus Briefs Filed in Health Care Cases, BLOOMBERG
NEWS (March 15, 2012, 12:55 PM), http://go.bloomberg.com/health-care-supreme-court/2012-
03-15/record-number-of-amicus-briefs-filed-in-health-care-cases/.
16 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment
in part, and dissenting in part).
17 Id. at 2642 (joint dissent).
18 Id. at 2651.
19 Id. at 2671–77.
20 Id. at 2587 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
21 Id. at 2583–84.  This did not, however, mean that it was subject to the Anti-Injunction
Act’s restrictions on judicial consideration of tax cases.
22 Id. at 2607 (majority opinion).
23 Id. at 2604.
24 Id. at 2608.
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When all was said and done, the ACA was essentially saved, and its
supporters, who had been holding their breaths awaiting the Court’s decision,
exhaled a huge sigh of relief.  Given the four votes to strike down the entire
Act and the fact that five Justices concluded that the ACA exceeded Con-
gress’s power under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses, relief
at dodging a bullet is natural.  But apprehension is as warranted as relief,
given that a majority of the Supreme Court concluded that Congress had
violated constitutional limits when it enacted an expansion of health-insur-
ance coverage by relying on an “individual mandate” technique that had
been proposed by the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, and
supported in the 1990s by a large group of Senate Republicans.25  Concern
seems especially apt here, when, as Gillian Metzger has emphasized, a ma-
jority of the Court would have held that Congress had transgressed funda-
mental constitutional boundaries without offering a clear account of what
those boundaries are.26
In this essay, we will explore potential implications of the Supreme
Court’s ACA decision for the future of social-insurance arrangements in the
United States, focusing on health insurance, Social Security and other retire-
ment income support, and unemployment insurance.  To understand our con-
cerns, we must describe the sometimes conflicting normative commitments
and institutional arrangements of our nation’s social-insurance programs.
Before turning to that, however, let us first offer a confession, an observa-
tion, and an echo.
II. A CONFESSION, AN OBSERVATION, AND AN ECHO
First, the confession: we were surprised that a majority of the Supreme
Court found that the individual mandate of the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause powers, including
Congress’s ability to adopt legislation that is “necessary and proper” to reg-
ulate commerce effectively.  Writing separately and together, we have ar-
gued for mandating—and subsidizing—individual and family health-
insurance purchases to prevent the unraveling of private health insurance
through risk segmentation.27  While the form of health insurance we recom-
mended varies from that of the ACA, the individual mandate we proposed
(as in the ACA) would be coupled with provisions requiring insurers to take
all comers, without regard to any preexisting conditions, and to eschew med-
ical underwriting.
25 Michael Cooper, Conservatives Sowed Idea of Health Care Mandate, Only to Spurn It
Later, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2012, at A15.
26 Gillian Metzger, Comment, To Tax, To Spend, To Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83, 98
(2012).
27 See GRAETZ & MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY, supra note 1, at 1–46; Michael J. Graetz, R
Universal Health Coverage Without an Employer Mandate, DOMESTIC AFF., Winter 1993, at
79.  For discussion of risk segmentation, see infra text between notes 48 and 49. R
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To be sure, an individual mandate—whether to purchase health or auto-
mobile insurance, vaccinate your children before sending them to school, or
pay taxes—sometimes involves intrusive enforcement and evasion.28  But as
long as our nation continues to provide emergency medicine to all of its
citizens and residents regardless of their ability to pay, prudence requires
that all pay a fair share of the costs of their medical care.
The consequences of inaction here are dramatic.  Virtually every Amer-
ican will use the health care system at some point, and people who have no
health insurance and are unable to pay for their health care services will
receive that care anyway.  The Solicitor General’s assertion that everyone is
“active in the market for health care”29 or “will, at some unknown point in
the future, engage in a health care transaction”30 is incontrovertible (even
though five Justices, including the Chief Justice, found it of no moment).
This is not true of broccoli, automobiles, or virtually any other product.
Health care providers cannot provide their services for free: costs are in-
volved.  Those costs must and will be borne by the people who pay for
health care services either directly or indirectly though insurance premiums
or taxes.  A reasonable estimate of the current burden on persons having
health insurance of paying for the uncompensated care of the uninsured is
roughly $1000 per year.31  No one denies that health insurance is interstate
commerce.  Nor does anyone deny that the cross-subsidies from paying cus-
tomers to nonpaying customers are very substantial.  Universal participation
in health insurance is important, as is a broad distribution of the costs and
benefits of insuring the populace.
The constitutional question is whether the thing being regulated sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce.  The Supreme Court has long held that
any activity that affects interstate commerce in a substantial way can be
regulated by Congress under the commerce power.  Hence the Court has
famously held that growing wheat or marijuana for home consumption can
be regulated as interstate commerce because both might leak into interstate
commerce.32  Moreover, the prospect of such leakage makes controlling
growth for home consumption a “necessary and proper” matter for federal
regulation in order to effectuate the regulation of those products when in
interstate commerce.  Hence, under these Supreme Court precedents, an ac-
tion need neither be in commerce, only possibly substantially affecting it,
28 See GRAETZ & MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY, supra note 1, at 178. R
29 Brief for Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 50, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No.
11-398).
30 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2590 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (referring to the Government’s
argument).
31 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2012) (“Requirement to maintain minimum essential coverage;
findings”); NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2585 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2611 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
32 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 11 (1942) (growing wheat); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1
(2005) (growing marijuana).
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nor be commerce at all as long as its regulation is necessary and proper to a
broader scheme of interstate-commerce regulation.
Even without relying on the characterization of the failure to buy health
insurance as a decision to self-insure, failing to buy health insurance clearly
does affect interstate commerce.  But the Chief Justice accepted the argu-
ment that the individual mandate is distinguishable from all previous in-
stances of congressional regulation of interstate commerce on the ground
that it regulates “inaction,” not “action.”33
The Chief Justice and the four dissenters refused to distinguish the re-
quirement to buy health insurance from a mandate to buy certain vegetables
or other products.34  As Justice Ginsburg’s concurring opinion explains, how-
ever, broccoli is not health insurance and inaction in the broccoli market has
nothing like the consequences of inaction in the health-insurance market.35
That is because the health-insurance market is not like the broccoli market or
the market for automobiles.  We know that virtually every American will use
the health care system at some point.  We also know that if someone is una-
ble to pay for their health care services and has no health insurance, they will
receive health care services anyway.  This is not true of broccoli or automo-
biles.  And we know that the costs incurred by health care providers must be
borne by the people who are paying for health care services or by tax reve-
nues—and they are.  No one denies that health insurance is interstate com-
merce.  And no one can deny that the cross-subsidies of paying customers to
non-paying customers are very substantial.  The question, remember, is
whether the thing that is being regulated substantially affects interstate com-
merce.36  Failure to buy health insurance clearly does; that it is in some sense
“inaction” rather than “action” should be a distinction without a difference
for Commerce Clause analysis.  Imagining a Congress mandating Americans
to buy broccoli or to buy automobiles is to leave the real world far, far
behind.37
When we advanced an individual mandate to purchase health insurance
in the 1990s and early 2000s, no serious constitutional objection was raised
against requiring all citizens and residents to purchase some specified mini-
mum level of health insurance.38  The individual-mandate idea had been pro-
33 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2587 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
34 Id. at 2588–89, 2591.
35 Id. at 2620, 2624–25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part).
36 Weiner, supra note 7 (manuscript at 75–77). R
37 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
38 See GRAETZ & MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY, supra note 1, at 171–81 (proposing a cata- R
strophic policy based on income with an individual mandate); Graetz, supra note 27, at 79 R
(proposing an individual mandate); Charles Fried, The June Surprises: Balls, Strikes, and the
Fog of War, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE, supra note 1 (manuscript at 51, 55) (stating that R
“until only a couple of years ago,” the mandate was “debated only in policy, not constitutional
terms”); Nathaniel Persily, Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison, Introduction, in THE
HEALTH CARE CASE, supra note 1 (manuscript at 1, 2) (“[T]he arguments that eventually won R
a majority of the Court . . . were barely on the radar screen when the legislation was drafted.”).
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posed by the Heritage Foundation, supported by dozens of Senate
Republicans, and only at the very last minute removed from the final 1992
health-insurance proposals of President George H.W. Bush.39  Massachusetts
enacted such a regime in 2006, and its then-governor, Mitt Romney, subse-
quently urged it as a model for national legislation.40  Like virtually every-
one else who had thought about it, we believed that the constitutionality of
such a mandate had been settled in the legal contests over the New Deal.41
Indeed, as we discuss further below, one of the objectives of our social in-
surance analysis and proposals was to liberate state-based unemployment
insurance from the archaic structure imposed upon it by long-gone constitu-
tional constraints on the federal government.42
Second, a brief observation: the Court’s Commerce Clause analysis is
not our only cause for puzzlement regarding the ACA opinions.  Take three
prominent examples: (1) Chief Justice Roberts’s unnecessary dicta telling us
that he would strike down the statute on Commerce Clause grounds in an
opinion upholding the law under Congress’s taxing powers;43 (2) the willing-
ness of the four dissenting Justices to abandon the Court’s previous jurispru-
dence and traditions on severability and urge striking down the entire statute,
not just the mandate (the only provision that they found constitutionally ob-
jectionable), nor just the mandate and its related health-insurance require-
ments of guaranteed coverage and community rating (as the Government
had urged);44 and (3) the 7–2 vote, holding for the first time that a federal-
state cooperative program was so coercive as to be constitutionally infirm
and doing so long before any federal administrator had exercised her statu-
tory discretion to cut off any state funds.  More on the last point below.
Third, an echo, with an elaboration.  We would emphasize, as has
Charles Fried, that the gravamen of the constitutional complaint against the
individual mandate is its supposed intrusion on personal freedom.45  But, as
Fried points out, no litigant ventured that the mandate violated the Liberty
Clause of the Fifth Amendment (which, having the identical scope as the
Liberty Clause of the Fourteenth, would have made a scheme like that of
Massachusetts unconstitutional).46  When all was said and done, no one at-
39 Fried, supra note 38 (manuscript at 55).  Note that one of the authors of this article, R
Michael J. Graetz, was present for and witnessed the last minute removal of the individual
mandate from the George H.W. Bush proposals in 1992.
40 See Mitt Romney, Mr. President, What’s the Rush?, USA TODAY, July 30, 2009, at 7A.
41 See, e.g., Fried, supra note 38 (manuscript at 51–53); Metzger, supra note 26, at 83–84. R
42 See GRAETZ & MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY, supra note 1, at 69–91, 188–209; infra Part R
IV.C.
43 For further discussion, see Metzger, supra note 26, at 84–85; Weiner, supra note 7 R
(manuscript at 73–74).
44 See Abbe R. Gluck & Michael J. Graetz, Op-Ed., The Severability Doctrine, N.Y.
TIMES, March 22, 2012, at A29.
45 See Fried, supra note 38 (manuscript at 52–53). R
46 Id.; see also Jamal Green, The Missing Due Process Argument, in THE HEALTH CARE
CASE, supra note 1 (manuscript at 91) (discussing the absence of due process arguments in the R
ACA case).
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tacked a state government’s requirement that individuals must purchase
health insurance or advanced any constitutional limitation on the states do-
ing so.  All we have now is a holding that if the federal government wishes
to do the same, it must exercise its powers to tax and spend, not its power to
regulate.  The ACA case, then, is best understood as a legal attack on the
means, but not the goals, of the health care legislation, even though, as we
shall show, by inhibiting potentially politically achievable means for ex-
panding social insurance, the Court may also have undermined the goals of
expanding and modernizing our nation’s social-insurance protections.
This emphasis on means rather than ends and on state over federal pow-
ers potentially poses significant risks for social insurance.  It may imply
harmful constraints on the ability of Congress to restructure these programs
to better meet the needs of the American people in our twenty-first century
economy.  Not coincidentally, the new constitutional framework announced
in the ACA decision favors those who want to dismantle rather than
strengthen our nation’s social-insurance protections.  We shall explain why
this is so with regard to not only health insurance but also unemployment
insurance and Social Security.  Doing so, however, first requires a little
background on U.S. social-insurance protections.
III. THE INSTITUTIONAL AND NORMATIVE COMPLEXITY OF
U.S. SOCIAL INSURANCE
What do we mean by “social insurance”?  The critical risk that social
insurance addresses is the risk of inadequate labor income.  For some, loss of
access to labor income may be complete and permanent, such as when death
or permanent disability strikes.  Others may lose labor income only episodi-
cally and temporarily through unemployment or less severe illnesses or inju-
ries.  This risk also occurs as part of the normal progress of the life cycle:
both youth and old age put one out of the labor market, so social insurance
helps to protect against poverty or inadequate income during these years.
“Private insurance” is composed of contracts to pool common risks so
that statistically predictable economic losses will be experienced as small
subtractions from all insured persons’ wealth rather than as calamities for an
unfortunate few.  “Social insurance” also pools risks, but social insurance
depends on government action, directed at a particular class of risks.  It is
designed to pursue societal purposes that could not or would not be achieved
through individual contracting in private insurance markets.  Social insur-
ance is not merely a variation on private insurance.  It is a different prod-
uct—a social rather than an individual (or group) contract.
The ability of private markets alone to provide reliable and affordable
insurance to protect against these risks to labor income is limited.  First,
some risks are so difficult to predict that private insurance actuaries cannot
make reliable estimates about exposure.  Risks also sometimes “co-vary” so
that many of the people in the insurance pool will realize the risks all at
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once.  If such risks cannot be diversified, a private insurance market may not
develop at all.  This is why unemployment insurance, for example, is always
provided publicly.  Second, there is a tendency for private insurance markets
to suffer from “adverse selection,” which occurs when individuals have bet-
ter information about their risks than the insurance companies.  This leads to
an overrepresentation of those with high risks in the insurance pool, and, if
insurance companies set their premiums based on average risks, they will
not survive.  On the other hand, if they assume that all buyers are high-risk,
they will set premiums so high that they will price people with low and
moderate risks out of the market, thereby greatly limiting insurance cover-
age.  Third, many insurance markets are subject to “moral hazard,” the pos-
sibility that insured people will change their behavior in a way that increases
their chances of collecting on their insurance.  So, the combination of uncer-
tainty, covariance of risks, adverse selection, and moral hazard undermines
private insurance markets.47  This results in the absence of some forms of
private insurance altogether and often produces high prices and limited cov-
erage when such insurance is offered.  Private insurance companies have
created strategies to deal with these problems, but they often don’t succeed.48
One common technique is to segment the market.  Consider, for exam-
ple, three groups of people.  The first group, L, has low risks, say of high
health expenditures; the second, M, has moderate risks; and the third, H, is
very risky.  (Perhaps folks in H are heavy smokers or have preexisting medi-
cal conditions.)  Unless the government requires it, a private insurance com-
pany will not insure L, M, and H at the same rate.  If a company offers to do
that, a competing company will soon offer the L and M folks lower rates.
So, private insurance markets tend to segment the market into groups with
homogeneous risks.  Indeed, private insurers often compete with one another
through their ability to segment markets and charge rates that differ based on
risks.  Life insurance and medical underwriting designed to individualize
risk assessments are prominent examples.
Sometimes such market segmentation is a good thing.  There is no rea-
son for careful and sober drivers to subsidize inattentive and drunk ones.
But there is a range of circumstances in which mandatory insurance, with
subsidies to those at high risk (through some combination of tax revenues
and the premiums of those with lower risks), is sound policy.  This is the
realm of social insurance.  Throughout the world, in various forms, social
insurance exists and covers—to a greater or lesser extent—the risk of being
out of the labor force for some period of time.  Common reasons for such
absences include illness, disability, unemployment, and retirement.  Univer-
sal government-sponsored, -provided, or -financed health insurance is
ubiquitous.
47 See GRAETZ & MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY, supra note 1, at 16–17. R
48 See id. at 16–18. See generally CAROL A. HELMER, REACTIVE RISK AND RATIONAL
ACTION: MANAGING MORAL HAZARD IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS (1985).
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Social insurance in the United States is a twentieth-century creation,
largely a product of the Great Depression.49  Before that, economic security
was mostly a family responsibility.  Children worked beside their parents on
the farm or in the family’s business after school.  Family members who be-
came too old to work were cared for by the next generation; the pastoral
image was Grandpa at the fireside waiting to greet his hardworking children
and grandchildren as they returned from the fields.  (Grandmas never retired
from housework and other chores.)  Family members who became disabled
were cared for within the family.  Private philanthropy sometimes provided
additional assistance.
Throughout the nineteenth century, American governments took re-
sponsibility only for their military and civilian employees, who were some-
times protected by federal or state pensions, health insurance, and disability
insurance.50  (Merchant seamen were a special case, having had a compul-
sory federal health-insurance scheme since the 1790s.51)  A number of states
provided cash assistance for widows and orphans.  A few large employers
introduced some pension benefits.  Anyone else without an income was sup-
ported by relatives or was relegated to the “poorhouse.”52
President Roosevelt’s 1935 Committee on Economic Security proposed
a comprehensive scheme of social insurance to provide protections against
what were then perceived to be life’s major threats to family income: loss of
parental income support, old age, death of the family breadwinner, disabil-
ity, illness, and unemployment.53  But that scheme was never completed.
Over the years, Americans—benefited and burdened by the New Deal leg-
acy—have continued to add to, subtract from, modify, and reaffirm a vision
that has been all but lost behind the details and political struggles surround-
ing particular programs.
The basic purpose of social insurance is income security.  To realize
that purpose, social insurance must cover common risks to income security
across the life cycle of individuals.  Risks to labor income obviously change
over the course of a person’s life.  Children are not expected to work.  In-
deed, in early childhood they cannot work, and later they are often limited in
the kinds and amount of work they can do.  During the working years, the
greatest threats to adequate income occur through illness or accident, job
loss because of economic dislocation or family responsibilities, and persis-
tent low wages.  Retiring from the workforce when one is older, though
predictable, resembles leaving the workforce due to disability or unemploy-
ment.  Retirees are often thought of as having inadequate savings to finance
49 See GRAETZ & MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY, supra note 1, at 24–25. R
50 See id.
51 An Act for the Relief of Sick and Disabled Seamen, ch. 77, 1 Stat. 605 (1798) (requir-
ing seamen to pay for a government-administered insurance scheme before setting sail).
52 GRAETZ & MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY, supra note 1, at 24. R
53 See COMM. ON ECON. SEC., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (1935), available at http://www.
ssa.gov/history/reports/ces.html.
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old age, but such shortcomings can be due to either myopia about how much
savings will be required or low wages over a lifetime—often coupled with
family responsibilities—that preclude the ability to save adequately.  If it is
to fulfill its social purposes effectively, social insurance must be universal in
coverage even though it may be provided in different ways through diverse
programs.  To provide an adequate level of protection, social insurance must
recognize and facilitate two different forms of redistribution—redistribution
of resources across the lifetime of individuals and redistribution from fami-
lies that have not incurred the insured risks to those that have.54  Our nation’s
current social-insurance arrangements perform better for the elderly than for
children or workers.
In the United States, we provide social insurance through a complex
mixture of mandatory and voluntary mechanisms, financed through both
public and private budgets, and with a dizzying array of functions allocated
between the states and the federal government.  This institutional complexity
is a function not only of historical and political contingencies, including
pre–New Deal constitutional doctrine, but also of conflicting normative
commitments.55  Health insurance alone, for example, reflects commitments
to the moral worth of every person’s life, to individual and collective respon-
sibilities, to a competitive market for health insurance, to consumer choice,
to professional integrity, to individual and physician autonomy, and to budg-
etary constraints.56
Let us briefly review the techniques for providing social insurance now
prevalent in the United States.  We start with public provision: the govern-
ment can run a social-insurance program and require participation by all
workers.  This is the current U.S. approach to risks of old age, death (survi-
vorship), disability, and hospital expenses in old age—the familiar Old-Age,
Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDHI) programs embodied in the
Social Security and Medicare Acts.  But even these familiar social-insurance
programs employ more heterogeneous mechanisms than are generally
acknowledged.
Medicare Part A (hospital care) and Part B (physician services) are im-
portant examples.  Part A is a mandatory program financed through a wage
tax on employers and employees.  Part B is a voluntary program financed
through relatively small premiums coupled with subsidies from general fed-
eral revenues—subsidies that are sufficiently large to provide coverage that
is virtually universal.57  Despite the differences in their financial and regula-
54 See GRAETZ & MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY, supra note 1, at 8–10, 25–28. R
55 For a general discussion of these commitments, which include market failure, solidarity,
mutual obligation, self-regard, paternalism, and social harmony and productivity, see id. at
17–23.
56 For further discussion of these conflicting normative commitments, see Michael J.
Graetz & Jerry L. Mashaw, Ethics, Institutional Complexity and Health Care Reform, 10 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 93 (1994).
57 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395j–1395w5 (2012).  Over time, the Part B subsidies became more and
more generous—growing from fifty percent of premiums to seventy-five percent.  And shifts
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tory arrangements, both programs were designed to ameliorate the threat to
family income security that medical costs pose for retirees.  Normal insur-
ance market segmentation in the private health-insurance markets would
produce high costs and spotty coverage for a group like the elderly that, on
average, combines high risks with low incomes.
Alternatively, insurance coverage can be mandated by law.  Some cur-
rent American social-insurance programs use mandates, either to require em-
ployer-based coverage or to compel individual participation in a state-run
scheme.  Workers’ compensation offers a ready example of the employer-
mandate mode.58  But mandates can be used as well to require individual
purchases of private-insurance protection.  Automobile liability insurance is
a standard U.S. example.  Individual mandates have also been considered
and implemented in the pension and health-insurance regimes of other na-
tions.59  Conservative critics have long urged reforming Social Security pen-
sions by substituting or including mandatory individual accounts that
function somewhat like Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs).60
The IRA exemplifies yet another common technique for socializing in-
surance markets: public subsidies provided through the tax law.  Medicare’s
coverage of physician services (Part B) may be our most conspicuous and
successful example of social insurance financed largely by subsidies out of
general revenues.  But direct subsidies are not the only alternative; much
U.S. social-insurance protection is subsidized through targeted tax breaks.61
Tax subsidies for voluntary employment-based regimes have tended to work
rather badly, but they are a way for government to “sponsor” and subsidize
social insurance without making the size of “government” appear bigger.62
The tax subsidies for employment-based health insurance and retirement in-
come are now the federal government’s largest “tax expenditures,” eclipsing
the deductibility of home-mortgage interest.63
in medical treatment modalities over time have made out-of-hospital care both medically more
important and financially more burdensome.  The current scheme may be outmoded, even after
the 2003 addition of a complex drug benefit (Part D)—or poorly designed from the begin-
ning—but the point of this example remains.  Public provision of insurance coverage need not
be of one type, either in its regulatory or its financial arrangements.
58 ISHITA SENGUPTA, VIRGINIA RENO & JOHN F. BURTON, JR., WORKERS’ COMPENSATION:
BENEFITS, COVERAGE, AND COSTS, 2005, at 1, 8 (2007), available at http://www.nasi.org/sites/
default/files/research/NASI_Workers_Comp_2005_Full_Report.pdf.
59 R. Kent Weaver, The Politics of Pensions: Lessons From Abroad, in FRAMING THE SO-
CIAL SECURITY DEBATE: VALUES, POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS 183, 184–85, 211–12 (R. Douglas
Arnold, Michael J. Graetz & Alicia H. Munnell eds., 1998) (describing mandatory-contribu-
tion systems abroad).
60 See, e.g., The Future of Social Security for This Generation and the Next: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Soc. Sec. of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. 5 (1997)
(statement of Stephen Moore, CATO Institute); Steve Forbes, How to Replace Social Security,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 1996, at A20.
61 See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 112TH CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES 823–1004
(Comm. Print 2012) (listing and describing tax benefits for social insurance).
62 See GRAETZ & MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY, supra note 1, at 61–64, 299–303. R
63 See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 112TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EX-
PENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2011–2015, at 36, 42 (Comm. Print 2012).
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Not all subsidies to social insurance are from general revenues.  Cross-
subsidies within insurance pools are a common response to undesirable pri-
vate insurance market segmentation.64  Higher earners can subsidize lower
earners through premium or payment arrangements in virtually any social-
insurance scheme, just as high earners subsidize low earners in the current
Social Security pension system.  Low-risk elders subsidize those with high
risks in the Medicare system by paying the same premiums and taxes.
Moreover, cross-subsidies are not limited to public insurance programs and
taxation.  Regulation also plays a role.  Mandated “community rating”
(which requires similar premiums for diverse populations), as is common in
many states and required under the ACA, for example, can force cross-subsi-
dies within private insurance pools that would otherwise generate differen-
tial premiums based on differences in risks.
Much social-insurance protection for health coverage during Ameri-
cans’ working years and for their retirement income is provided through em-
ployer-sponsored, tax-favored health-insurance and retirement funds.  This
voluntary coverage is far from universal, turning on the worker’s connection
to a particular employer.65  The spotty coverage, however, only signals that
this kind of social insurance is inadequate; it does not negate its social-insur-
ance nature.
Finally, means-tested, noncontributory programs for dependent children
and the aged were a part of the original Social Security Act.  Indeed, old-age
assistance based on need is Title I of the Social Security Act of 1935, and it
enjoyed broad public support when the statute was enacted.66  Almost a dec-
ade before the Social Security Act was amended to include contributory,
earnings-related disability insurance, means-tested support for both the blind
and the totally and permanently disabled had already been added to the
Act.67  The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) has become an increasingly
important wage subsidy for low-income families with children.68  Indeed,
what we may now think of as the conventional conception of social insur-
ance through taxing and spending—mandatory, contributory, earnings-re-
lated, universal or near universal programs, such as Social Security’s
OASDI—accounted for only slightly more than half of all social-insurance
transfers in the United States by the end of the twentieth century.69  The rest
64 See discussion of risk segmentation supra text between notes 48 and 49. R
65 See EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., THE U.S. RETIREMENT INCOME SYSTEM 5 fig.5
(2005), available at http://ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/0405fact.pdf (indicating that, as of
1999, only about half of private-sector employees participated in retirement plans); Which
Workers Are Most Likely to Have Employment Based Coverage?, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST.,
http://www.ebri.org/publications/benfaq/index.cfm?fa=hlthfaq13 (last visited May 12, 2013)
(indicating that only fifty percent of service workers have employment-based health coverage).
66 See ANDREW ACHENBAUM, SOCIAL SECURITY: VISIONS AND REVISIONS 30 (1986).
67 See GRAETZ & MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY, supra note 1, at 62. R
68 See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 112TH CONG., supra note 63, at 947–53 (noting R
that the EITC reduced number of people in poverty by 4.9 million in 2009).
69 See GRAETZ & MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY, supra note 1, at 62–63. R
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have been provided through a combination of mandates and subsidies, with
the subsidies often, but not always, delivered through the tax law.70
In summary, social insurance is a distinctive set of programs designed
to moderate the risks of current income loss or inadequacy by providing
secure cash or near-cash entitlements on the occurrence of specified risks.
Although the general risk to be insured is simply the lack of labor income,
the ways that risks materialize are diverse and change over the lifetimes of
individuals and families.  Risks also are often different for each individual
and family, and they differ over time as social and economic conditions
change.
IV. THE PROBLEM OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
This diversity of risks requires multiple techniques for providing social
insurance.  It is impossible to know yet just how the Court’s ACA decision
may inhibit the federal government’s flexibility in employing these tech-
niques; too much ambiguity remains.  But it is not too soon to explore the
potential implications for the future of U.S. social insurance of the constitu-
tional limitations embraced by a majority of the Court.  We consider three
contexts: (1) health insurance, (2) retirement income security, and (3) unem-
ployment insurance.
A. Health Insurance
In the health arena, our institutional arrangements have long been inad-
equate.71  We have, year after year, left forty to fifty million persons unin-
sured and many millions more with inadequate or insecure coverage.  Yet
the United States has spent nearly twice the share of its economic output on
health as other industrial nations—but with little or nothing in measurably
improved health outcomes to show for it.72
There was nearly a century of unsuccessful efforts to reform our na-
tion’s system of providing health insurance prior to the ACA.  Proposals for
major change by virtually every President, Democrat or Republican, since
FDR were all defeated.73  Only Lyndon Johnson enjoyed a major success,
creating Medicare and Medicaid in 1965,74 to which George W. Bush man-
aged to add both prescription drug coverage and “Medicare Advantage” on
70 See id.
71 Our own social-insurance conception of health insurance is as “catastrophic” loss, de-
fining catastrophic as income-based. See GRAETZ & MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY, supra note 1, R
at 171–81.
72 Id. at 127.
73 See generally sources cited supra note 2. R
74 See Medicare Program—General Information, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVICES, http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-General-Information/MedicareGenInfo/in-
dex.html?redirect=/medicaregeninfo/ (last modified Mar. 24, 2012, 10:35 AM).
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a quite different model.75  As we have said, Part A, hospital care, is
mandatory and financed by payroll taxes.  Part B, physician services, is vol-
untary and subsidized from general revenues.  Both Parts A and B are ad-
ministered by the federal government as insurer, although much of the actual
claims processing is contracted out to private insurance companies.76  Part D,
prescription drug coverage, is voluntary and subsidized from general reve-
nues but provided by highly regulated private insurers, as is Part C, “Medi-
care Advantage,” which allows Medicare beneficiaries to opt into a private
insurance plan whose premiums are paid by Medicare.
Medicaid is a joint federal-state program for poor persons and certain
others who meet specified eligibility criteria.77  Medicaid coverage is often
broader than Medicare, especially for long-term care.78  Since Medicaid in-
come- and assets-eligibility tests vary among states, there is great interstate
variation in who qualifies and for what benefits.79  Because of its income and
resources criteria for coverage, Medicaid coverage frequently creates “in-
come cliffs” for low-income workers.  A few more dollars can mean com-
plete loss of coverage, which means that a good job opportunity, if it does
not include adequate health insurance, may be too risky to take.  Moreover,
both eligibility and coverage vary from state to state under general federal
criteria.
Workers with health-insurance coverage rely predominantly on volun-
tary, tax-subsidized employer plans.80  But these subsidies are distribution-
ally regressive, and small businesses are less likely to provide employment-
based coverage.81
Importantly, critical examination of the pre-ACA system of American
health insurance reveals the limits of private insurance, federal tax subsidies,
state financing, and voluntariness when attempting to fulfill the normal so-
cial-insurance goals of universality and progressivity.  And, of course, com-
plexity reigned long before enactment of the ACA.  Moreover, the U.S.
health-insurance system has managed to combine large and accelerating
medical expenditures with stagnant or decreasing insurance coverage.82  De-
spite the major gaps in voluntary, subsidized social insurance, Medicare Part
B demonstrates that if everyone’s subsidies are large enough and financed by
progressive taxation, one can approach universality with some progressivity.
Because Medicaid provides coverage for low-income families, the groups
75 See Health Plans—General Information, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SER-
VICES, http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Health-Plans/HealthPlansGenInfo/index.html?redirect=/
healthplansgeninfo/ (last modified Apr. 25, 2013, 2:20 PM).
76 See GRAETZ & MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY, supra note 1, at 131. R
77 See Eligibility, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-In-
formation/By-Topics/Eligibility/Eligibility.html (last visited May 12, 2013).
78 See GRAETZ & MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY, supra note 1, at 134–35. R
79 See Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid’s Next Fifty Years: Aligning an Old Program With the
New Normal, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE, supra note 1 (manuscript at 337, 342). R
80 See Which Workers, supra note 65. R
81 See GRAETZ & MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY, supra note 1, at 141; Which Workers, supra R
note 65. R
82 See GRAETZ & MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY, supra note 1, at 127–42. R
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that have generally been made worst off in our health-insurance system are
not the poor, but rather those struggling to become or remain middle class.
The ACA endeavors to increase coverage and restrain medical inflation
while maintaining the vast majority of existing institutional arrangements.
New and stronger federal regulatory mechanisms were an essential element
of cost control in the ACA, and the individual mandate was considered nec-
essary to move toward universal coverage while keeping a marketplace of
private insurers.
On the Supreme Court’s current view, a so-called “single-payer sys-
tem,” like Medicare for all, would not have raised the constitutional objec-
tions lodged against the ACA, even though it would have been a far more
aggressive federal intervention in the private marketplace.  The conventional
wisdom, however, is that no constitutional roadblocks are needed to stymie a
single-payer model: insurance-industry political muscle and conservative
ideological resistance will do the job nicely.  If a single-payer system is po-
litically off the table, a program as comically complex as the ACA begins to
look like the only federal path to universal coverage—and maybe cost
control.
The Court has never recognized any constitutional difficulty with shift-
ing more health-insurance responsibilities of the federal government to the
states or to private actors (including employers) acting voluntarily.  Devolv-
ing the purchase and financing of health insurance and medical care to the
states and private parties is at the core of conservative proposals for health-
insurance reform, such as Paul Ryan’s premium support plan for individuals
to replace Medicare and block grants to the states to replace Medicaid.83
However, all U.S. experience suggests that shifting more of these responsi-
bilities to the states and private parties will serve to increase the gaps and
differences in coverage and reduce or eliminate the redistribution of risks.
At stake in the ACA litigation, then, was an effort to erect a constitu-
tional barrier to what had been only a political challenge.  By limiting Con-
gress’s means of providing social insurance, through denial of Commerce
Clause validity for the individual mandate, the ACA’s opponents intended to
threaten its core goals, especially that of universal coverage.  Moving for-
ward, if Medicare for all is barred politically—and insisting that states ex-
pand their Medicaid coverage is unconstitutional “coercion”—any
improvements to the ACA’s coverage will have to use the taxing and spend-
ing power to support greater access to private health insurance.  If, however,
for political reasons, necessary increases in the tax for failure to purchase
insurance cannot be enacted, one wonders whether legislation meant to
strengthen the ACA can be crafted that is both effective and meets the frag-
mented Supreme Court’s tests.  At some point—perhaps we have already
reached it—Americans will have many health-insurance choices and little
83 See H. BUDGET COMM., THE PATH TO PROSPERITY: A BLUEPRINT FOR AMERICAN RE-
NEWAL 37–56 (2012), available at http://paulryan.house.gov/uploadedfiles/pathtoprosper-
ity2013.pdf (setting forth the Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Resolution).
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prospect of understanding their entitlements, their options, their costs, and
the adequacy of their coverage.  Other key pillars of our nation’s social-
insurance system, such as Social Security and unemployment insurance, face
similar challenges in this new constitutional environment.
B. Insuring Adequate Retirement Income
Social Security has long been America’s most successful social-insur-
ance program.  Ninety-five percent of working Americans are now covered
by the retirement, disability, and survivors’ benefits of Social Security, a
mandatory federal program characterized by a progressive benefit structure
financed by payroll taxes.  No one doubts the program’s success in diminish-
ing poverty among our nation’s elderly.84  But as ongoing demographic
changes reduce the ratio of workers to retirees from 3:1 to 2:1, Social Secur-
ity’s financial challenges have recently come to the fore in our national de-
bates.  This, in turn, has created an opportunity for some of Social Security’s
political opponents—2012 vice presidential candidate Paul Ryan and Presi-
dent George W. Bush are notable recent examples—to urge substituting pri-
vate savings accounts, which is essentially self-protection through thrift, for
at least some substantial portion of Social Security’s retirement benefits.85
Why retirement—a routine and largely predictable event—is not an ap-
propriate occasion for self-protection through savings does not readily lend
itself to a short, simple answer.  But its essence lies in the uncertainty about
future economic conditions, the risk of inflation, and the risk of longevity (in
other words, the risk of outliving one’s savings).86  Every Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nation and many others
have instituted some form of social insurance to promote retirement secur-
ity.87  In the United States, we have relied on what has long been labeled a
“three-legged stool,” composed of (1) the inflation-adjusted, universally
available defined benefit of Social Security; (2) voluntary, tax-advantaged,
employer-based private pensions (which now largely take the form of de-
fined-contribution plans); and (3) private savings.88  The fundamental debate
of recent decades has been whether and how to change this mix.
Interestingly, while liberals and conservatives have split over the im-
portance of retaining (and perhaps even strengthening) Social Security’s pro-
vision of retirement income, Democrats and Republicans have agreed on the
84 See GRAETZ & MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY, supra note 1, at 101–02. R
85 See Sahil Kapur, Ryan: I Still Support Social Security Privatization, TPMDC (Oct. 11,
2012, 10:35 PM), http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2012/10/paul-ryan-defends-social-se-
curity-privatization.php; President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Feb. 2,
2005).
86 For more detail, see GRAETZ & MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY, supra note 1, at 92–111. R
87 See R. Kent Weaver, supra note 59, at 185. R
88 Michael J. Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of Retirement Security and Tax Policies, 135
U. PA. L. REV. 851, 856–58 (1987).
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importance of strengthening private savings for retirement.89  Moving toward
universal savings accounts has served as a rallying cry for both the left and
the right.90  The critical distinction has been that Republicans have often pro-
posed such accounts in lieu of at least some portion of current Social Secur-
ity while Democrats have pushed for mandatory private accounts on top of
existing Social Security protections.91
In our prior work, we have urged some specific reforms to put Social
Security on a sounder financial footing, and in addition, we have proposed
additional mandatory personal investment accounts.92  The purposes of the
latter proposal are to increase prefunding of retirement income, allow wider
participation in the benefits of capital appreciation, and enhance personal
responsibility for retirement.93  (We also have urged using mandatory per-
sonal savings accounts “to reduce the moral hazard of other social insurance
protections, such as unemployment insurance”;94 more about that later.95)
These “[m]andatory personal accounts would provide for all workers a sec-
ond tier of retirement savings that could fill gaps in current employer-based
pension coverage—coverage that now strongly favors higher-paid, better-
educated, and older workers, as well as workers employed by large firms.”96
While some other proponents of individual accounts have urged volun-
tary rather than mandatory accounts, our nation’s experience with IRAs dem-
onstrates that universality can be accomplished only by mandating that each
individual have an account.97  Making voluntary, tax-subsidized IRAs avail-
able to bolster savings for retirement—like employer-sponsored retirement
plans—has principally benefited higher-income, better-educated workers.98
Low-wage workers, of course, would have difficulty funding private retire-
ment accounts if payroll deductions, in addition to current Social Security
and Medicare taxes, were required.  Thus, subsidies for such workers,
funded from general tax revenues, would be necessary.  As with health in-
surance, however, even subsidized, voluntary (rather than mandatory) ac-
counts would produce important gaps in both coverage and adequacy for
low- and middle-class workers and their families.99
89 See, e.g., NAT’L. ACAD. OF SOC. INS., UNCHARTED WATERS: PAYING BENEFITS FROM
INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS IN FEDERAL RETIREMENT POLICY 5–7 (Virginia P. Reno et al. eds.,
2005), available at http://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research/Uncharted_Waters_Report.
pdf.
90 See id.
91 See id. at i, 5–7 (providing examples of proposals for individual accounts).
92 See GRAETZ & MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY, supra note 1, at 254–63. R
93 See id. at 263–67.
94 Id. at 263.
95 See infra text accompanying note 121. R
96 GRAETZ & MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY, supra note 1, at 264. R
97 For a description of tax-favored IRAs and their coverage, see STAFF OF S. COMM. ON
THE BUDGET, 112TH CONG., supra note 61, at 973–77. R
98 Id. at 977 (stating that forty percent of IRA benefits go to taxpayers with incomes above
$200,000).
99 For evidence that mandated retirement savings are more effective than voluntary, tax-
preferred savings, see Raj Chetty et al., Active vs. Passive Decisions and Crowd-Out in Retire-
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Along with individual-account proponents on both the political left and
right, we also saw no constitutional objections to mandating such accounts
before the ACA litigation.  But, given what a majority of the Court has said
about mandating health-insurance purchases, it is now difficult to see how
such accounts could pass constitutional scrutiny under the Commerce
Clause.  It is significantly more difficult to demonstrate a link between
mandatory individual retirement accounts and interstate commerce than be-
tween interstate commerce and the purchase of health insurance.  In the
wake of the Court’s health-insurance decision, it seems clear that a majority
of the current Court would hold that a federal mandate for personal savings
accounts could be accomplished only indirectly through the Taxing and
Spending Clause, and not by a straightforward requirement that everyone
save a specified amount.100  The obvious technique, then—ignoring political
barriers—would be to impose a tax that is completely forgiven by putting an
equivalent amount into a savings account for specified purposes.  However,
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, which emphasizes the small size of the ACA
penalty (the tax) relative to the cost of purchasing the ACA’s mandated
health-insurance coverage, raises the possibility that a larger penalty-to-ben-
efit ratio (even if located in the tax code) might be viewed as a substitute for
regulation and thus run afoul of the Court’s new Commerce Clause
limitations.101
If, as appears to be the case, a direct mandate of savings for specified
purposes is now viewed by the Court as beyond the federal government’s
regulatory powers, but not as overstepping its taxing and spending powers, it
might again seem that only the means, not the ends, of such a policy have
been limited by the Court’s ACA decision.  But the practical and political
limitations implied by the Court’s decision may, nevertheless, loom large.102
It was the allergic reaction of Representatives and Senators to the “T”
word that caused the ACA “tax” to be presented as a “penalty.”  Indeed,
since June 6, 1978, when—by a nearly two-to-one margin—the people of
California added a measure known as “Proposition 13” to that state’s consti-
tution, increasing taxes has become extremely difficult politically.103  Pro-
position 13 limited state property taxes and also made it very difficult for the
ment Savings Accounts: Evidence From Denmark (Dec. 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
available at obs.rc.fas.harvard.edu/chetty/crowdout.pdf.
100 This majority would consist of the five Justices who determined that the individual
mandate of the ACA was not authorized by the Commerce Clause: Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito.
101 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012) (opin-
ion of Roberts, C.J.) (“[W]e need not here decide the precise point at which an exaction
becomes so punitive that the taxing power does not authorize it.”).
102 Even mandated savings demonstrates the emptiness of the action vs. inaction distinc-
tion.  Savings for retirement (or a period of unemployment) is a deferral of consumption.
Requiring savings can be viewed as equivalent to limiting current consumption.  This is cer-
tainly a constitutionally appropriate use of the taxing power given the long history of both
broad consumption taxes and narrow taxes on the consumption of specific items (such as
alcohol, tobacco, and tires).
103 See ROBERT KUTTNER, REVOLT OF THE HAVES 17–20 (1980).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLP\7-2\HLP204.txt unknown Seq: 20  9-AUG-13 9:28
362 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 7
state legislature to raise other taxes.104  In rejecting calls to be “responsible”
by virtually all of their elected representatives, California voters spurred the
anti-tax movement, which has since served as the lynchpin of Republican
Party politics.105  Opposition to tax increases has long been the glue that has
held the Republican coalition together.  Grover Norquist, an outspoken
leader of the Republican anti-tax movement, describes taxes as “the central
vote-drawing issue.”106  “You win this issue,” he says, “you win—over
time—all issues.”107
Even Democrats have been afraid to support new or increased taxes,
except on the rich.  On April 16, 2008, debating Hillary Clinton in Philadel-
phia at a crucial moment in their campaign for the Democratic presidential
nomination, Barack Obama pledged not to raise taxes on Americans earning
less than $250,000 a year.108  One of the debate’s moderators, ABC’s George
Stephanopoulos, asked if this statement was “an absolute, read-my-lips-
pledge.”109  Through the use of those words, Stephanopoulos was channeling
George H.W. Bush’s famous promise to never increase taxes. When Bush
accepted the 1988 Republican nomination for President, he suggested, mak-
ing his biggest political mistake, that the Democratic Congress would push
him to sign a tax increase, and his response was: “Read my lips, no new
taxes.”  Two years after that, facing a pressing need to take control of spiral-
ing budget deficits and a Democratic Congress insisting that both tax in-
creases and spending restraint be part of any budget deal, Bush negotiated
and signed the 1990 Budget Reconciliation Act, which curtailed government
spending and raised taxes.110  When it came time for the 1992 presidential
election, and in the midst of a weak economy, the voters no longer trusted
him and denied him reelection.111  Many times during the 2008 campaign
and while in office, Barack Obama repeated his pledge not to increase taxes
for any family with less than a $250,000 annual income.112  This, of course,
takes off the table any generally applicable tax to promote or create personal
savings accounts.
Thus, if individual accounts can be implemented only through taxation,
they may be politically impossible.  The potential implications of the Court’s
decision for modernizing unemployment insurance may be even greater.
104 For more on the enactment of Proposition 13, see generally id.
105 See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT
OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 9 (2006); KUTTNER, supra note 103, at 19–20. R
106 GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 105, at 9. R
107 Id.
108 MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE END OF ENERGY: THE UNMAKING OF AMERICA’S ENVIRON-
MENT, SECURITY, AND INDEPENDENCE 184 (2011).
109 Id.
110 Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-573
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C. § 1022).
111 GRAETZ, supra note 108, at 184.
112 Id. at 185.
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C. Unemployment Insurance
Unemployment insurance (UI), a centerpiece of the original 1935 So-
cial Security Act, was an essential response to the Great Depression.  Ever
since, UI has provided crucial support for American workers in recessionary
periods.  But the recent Great Recession has surely demonstrated what pol-
icy analysts have long understood: our system of UI needs to be modernized.
Today, unemployment insurance undoubtedly should be a national program.
In our nation’s economy, with its single currency, macroeconomic shocks
affect the entire country.  But there are very substantial regional variations in
an economic downturn’s timing and intensity.  These variations argue for
including the whole nation in the insurance pool; otherwise regional de-
mands will be greatest when regional capacity is weakest.
But, unemployment insurance, as it was constructed in the 1930s and as
it remains today, is a set of diverse state programs for which the federal
government offers a peculiar incentive.  The unemployment insurance pro-
gram was structured as a national tax on employers who fund their employ-
ees’ unemployment benefits, modeled—for reasons of both politics and
constitutional law—after a federal-state estate tax arrangement that had been
upheld by the pre–New Deal Supreme Court.113  The federal tax is waived
for any employer whose state imposes a similar unemployment tax and es-
tablishes an unemployment-insurance benefits program that conforms to the
broad contours of the federal statute.114  That every state would act on this
incentive was guaranteed by the unnecessarily high rate set for the federal
tax.115  States can virtually always make their employers, or at least some
substantial number of them, better off by having a state system of their own.
As governor of New York, Franklin Roosevelt understood the difficul-
ties with this design.  He attempted to obtain agreement among his fellow
governors to adopt parallel unemployment insurance systems in every state.
As he told them then, unless we all act together, none of us can act at all.116
Roosevelt’s reasoning was impeccable.  Interstate competition makes it
problematic for states to act alone to maintain robust programs of unemploy-
ment insurance.  Such competition continuously tempts individual states to
improve their ‘business climate’ by reducing unemployment insurance taxes
for existing and prospective employers.  These “races to the bottom” will
113 For a description of the development of the UI structure, including the crucial role of
Justice Louis Brandeis, see John Fabian Witt, The Secret History of the Chief Justice’s Obama-
care Decision, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE, supra note 1 (manuscript at 215, 216–18).  The UI R
structure was upheld by a 5–4 vote in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
114 See Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301–11 (Supp. V 2011).
115 See generally Unemployment Insurance Tax Topic, EMP. & TRAINING ADMIN., http://
workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/uitaxtopic.asp (last updated Dec. 10, 2012).  For a
comparison of state unemployment laws, see Comparison of State Unemployment Laws, EMP.
& TRAINING ADMIN., http://www.unemploymentinsurance.doleta.gov/unemploy/comparison
2012.asp (last updated Sept. 11, 2012).
116 GRAETZ & MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY, supra note 1, at 75 (citing DANIEL NELSON, R
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 1915–1935 (1969)).
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undermine both the economic security and macroeconomic stabilization pur-
poses of unemployment insurance, as well as its effectiveness.  As a result,
states now have very different unemployment insurance programs.117  But
the general trend over time has been for the states to reduce both coverage
and benefits and to fail to respond to changes in labor markets that put more
and more low-wage, part-time, and part-year workers outside the system.
The Great Recession and its halting recovery have exposed major flaws
in the current unemployment-insurance structure.  Benefits paid to unem-
ployed workers are frequently inadequate to keep their families afloat and to
facilitate their search for a new job, and many workers find themselves with-
out any coverage at all.118  And, while state administration of UI may be
appropriate, there is little or no case to be made for state financing of a
national unemployment program.  The current financing structure is a crea-
ture of archaic constitutional constraints.
We find nothing in the Court’s ACA opinion that would bar federaliza-
tion of UI financing and eligibility rules.  Again, the Court’s opinion calls
into question only the techniques for doing so.  Federal repeal and replace-
ment of existing arrangements is not barred constitutionally, but the political
obstacles to such a sweeping change are large.
More incremental and therefore potentially more politically palatable
changes, such as eliminating the federal credit for state UI taxes unless spec-
ified conditions are met, may, however, now be constitutionally questiona-
ble.  If a majority of Justices found that such changes crossed the vague
barrier against “coercion” of the states—as the Court did with the ACA’s
changes to Medicaid—then the changes would be barred.  The power of the
UI program’s tax incentive may make it irresistible and, therefore, on at least
one reading of the ACA opinion, unconstitutional.  Given the ambiguities of
the Court’s opinions, it is impossible to know for sure.119
In addition to its unique structural defects, unemployment insurance
confronts especially large problems of moral hazard.  People are more likely
to stop working when the costs of doing so are cushioned by the replacement
of much of their wages.  In addition, private insurance companies suffer in
economic downturns, just as claims for unemployment insurance rise.  As
117 Id. at 75; see generally Comparison of State Unemployment Laws, supra note 115. R
118  See STEPHEN A. WOODBURY & MARGARET C. SIMMS, AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE RE-
SEARCH: STRENGTHENING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Nat’l. Acad. of
Soc. Ins., Unemployment Insurance Brief No. 1, 2011), available at http://www.nasi.org/sites/
default/files/research/Ui%20Brief%20No%201[1].pdf; WAYNE VROMAN, UNEMPLOYMENT IN-
SURANCE: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (Nat’l. Acad. of Soc. Ins., Unemployment Insurance
Brief No. 2, 2011), available at http://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research/UI%20Brief%
20No%202.pdf.
119 As Gillian Metzger has emphasized, the Court was willing “to hold that Congress had
transgressed fundamental constitutional boundaries without offering a clear account of what
those boundaries are.  Coercion is notoriously difficult to identify, in large part because no
agreement exists on the proper baseline against which to assess if a state funding condition
goes too far.”  Metzger, supra note 26, at 98–99. R
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we have seen recently, insurers can go bankrupt in a deep recession.120
Hence, even if private insurance could solve the moral-hazard problem, pri-
vate unemployment insurance would be inadequate.  Unsurprisingly, private
UI is virtually unknown.
To limit the potential for moral hazard, we have suggested combining
expanded unemployment-insurance coverage with a system of individual ac-
counts for each worker.121  In such a system, each employee would be re-
quired to contribute, say, three percent of wages to her account in order to
help fund both periods of unemployment and retirement.  If a worker exper-
iences a period of compensated unemployment, her account would be re-
duced by, say, twenty percent of the costs of the unemployment
compensation paid.  A worker whose account is insufficient to fund the re-
quired copayment would face a surcharge on her wages when re-employed,
which would be paid until such time as the individual’s account had an ade-
quate balance.  Upon retirement or death, amounts left in the worker’s ac-
count would be paid in retirement benefits or as a death benefit to the
worker’s heirs.
The Supreme Court’s ACA decision, however, introduces new constitu-
tional uncertainties into this kind of much-needed modernization of our na-
tion’s system of unemployment insurance.  Changes such as we have
suggested here may remain possible, but must now apparently be grounded
in Congress’s taxing power—the power Congress is most reluctant to use.  It
is difficult to know why barring Congress’s ability to mandate individual
savings accounts is a sensible or appropriate reading of the Constitution.  It
turns entirely on the majority’s unconvincing reliance on the distinction be-
tween action and inaction in the ACA case.
V. CONCLUSION
Health insurance is just one component of a modern system of social
insurance—protection of some degree of income security for all Americans
in the face of risks common in a dynamic market economy.  None of the
risks to loss of wage income that we have discussed here—illness, retire-
ment, or unemployment—ever has been or ever will be adequately protected
through private insurance alone.122  Transferring responsibilities from the
federal government to state governments, or from governmental risk-spread-
ing arrangements to individuals or families, inevitably weakens these protec-
tions.  When states are responsible for financing basic social-insurance
protections, families’ economic security depends on which side of a river
120 The recent AIG bailout is the most notorious example. See The Causes and Effects of
the AIG Bailout: Hearing Before the Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong.
(2008).
121 See GRAETZ & MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY, supra note 1, at 263–66. R
122 Both short- and long-term disability constitute additional examples of the kind of risks
at stake here, but we do not discuss those issues here.
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they call home.  State-based financing also introduces the potential for de-
structive interstate races to the bottom, inevitably creating important gaps
and inadequacies of coverage.
A common feature of the ACA and our proposals for improving retire-
ment security and unemployment insurance is their incremental nature: they
largely build on existing institutional arrangements rather than starting anew.
The ACA and our retirement security proposals, in particular, fall in the mid-
dle between the more radical public-provision and privatization proposals
advanced in Washington in recent years.  It would be ironic indeed if one
consequence of the Supreme Court’s ACA decision is to rule out of bounds
those kinds of incremental changes that are most consonant with the checks
and balances at the heart of the democratic structure of our nation’s
Constitution.
The originalist constitutional vision, embodied in the constitutional
challenge to the ACA and found in both Chief Justice Roberts’s and the dis-
senting Justices’ opinions, ignores the necessity in today’s economy of plac-
ing both the power and the responsibility for social insurance with the
federal government.  It is a mystery to us why, when it comes to social-
insurance protections, key politicians seem to believe that state governments
always function better than the national government—or, even if not, that
our Constitution commits us to a national government of quite limited power
and functions in this arena.
To be sure, a majority of the Supreme Court, in refusing to strike down
the individual mandate of the ACA, rejected that view.  But in doing so, the
Court introduced important new limitations and uncertainties into the consti-
tutionally permissible techniques by which the national government can ful-
fill its social-insurance goals.  Unfortunately, the technique permitted by the
Court—taxing—is the most politically difficult for Congress to employ.
Make no mistake: the constitutional challenge to the ACA and the com-
plementary political efforts to devolve social-insurance responsibilities to
the states and to individuals pose a challenge to the very idea of social insur-
ance.  If our individual freedom includes the liberty to opt out of participa-
tion in universal risk pooling and to evade the intertemporal and interfamily
redistribution that resides at the core of our social-insurance protections, the
very idea of providing social insurance is threatened.
Social insurance allows us to thrive in an economic system where only
some members of society enjoy financial success because both effort and
luck play a crucial role.  Social insurance is at its base a deeply conservative
idea.  By protecting family incomes from common risks in a market econ-
omy, it simultaneously provides a critical political protection for that same
market economy.  Why a conservative Court or conservative politicians
should want to make the American social-insurance system less effective or
more difficult to reform is a mystery.
